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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court initially had jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i).

However, on October 27,

1995, the Utah Supreme Court "poured-over" the appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals, impliedly pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-

4

3(2) (k) . The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1

Whether the trial court, after granting appointed trial

counsel 's Motion to Withdraw' erred by failing to appoint counsel to
represent Defendant during the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing. The
trial court's failure to appoint counsel is a legal determination,
based

on constitutional

and legal principles, and therefore is
Cf. State

reviewed for correction of error.

v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

940-41 (Utah 1994) (whether a defendant validly waived his or her
Miranda
State

rights is a question of law reviewed for correct of error);
Richardson.

\

.8

(Utah App. 1992)

(trial

court's interpretation of binding case law presents question of law
that is reviewed for correctness); State

v. Thurman,

846 P.2d 1256,

1270-71 & n.ll (Utah 1993) (trial court's determination of whether
consent to search is voluntary is question of law that is reviewed
for correction of error) ; State i;;
1993)

(ultimate

legal determination

voluntary is conclusion of la\ ,,

Ma be, 864 P. 2d 890, 892 (Utah
of whether

a confession is

reviewed for correctness) .

This issue was not raised before the trial court.
case

presents

exceptional

circumstances

5

and/or

However, this
circumstances

See State

constituting plain error.

922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
1987), on subsequent
2.

appeal,

v.

Gibbons,

Archambeau,

820 P.2d 920,

740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah

779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989).

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the course
As set forth in State

of sentencing Defendant.

v.

Gibbons,

779 P.2d

1133, 1135 (Utah 1989), "An appellate court will set aside a sentence
imposed by the trial court" (1) "if the sentence represents an abuse
of discretion, see

State

v.

Gerrard,

584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)";

(2) "if the trial judge fails to consider all legally
factors, see State v.

Holland,

relevant

111 P.2d 1019, (Utah 1989)"; or (3)
State

"if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law.
v.

Shelby,

728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986)."

This issue was preserved

in the trial court by trial counsel's request that the trial court
utilize the option of an inpatient treatment program or halfway house
rather than incarceration

(R. 64-66, Transcript of July 25, 1995,

Sentencing Hearing).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
U.S. Const. amend VI

14

Utah Const. art. I, § 12

14

See case law cited above

in passim

6

The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose

interpretation

is determinative, are set out

verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information, Defendant, Jesse Marie Martinez, was charged
with Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1), Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b)(c), and Possession of
a Controlled Substance, a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

58-37-8 (2) (a) (I) . On

February

24,

1995,

the

Honorable Michael G. Allphin, Second Circuit Court, bound Defendant
over to the district court.
On March 21, 1995, Defendant appeared before the district court
for arraignment and pleaded not guilty.

Thereafter, on April 11,

1995, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel, Mr. William J.
Albright, for Pretrial Hearing before the district court and entered
a guilty plea to only Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony
pursuant

to

plea

negotiation.

In

accordance

with

the

plea

negotiation, all other charges were dismissed.
On May 23, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel
for Sentencing.

During the Sentencing Hearing, Defendant's appointed
7

trial counsel, Mr. Albright, interrupted and informed the trial court
that Defendant had filed a bar complaint against him.
counsel
counsel.

then made a

Defendant's

"formal motion" to withdraw as Defendant's

The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and informed

Defendant that "this is the time set for sentencing" and, as part of
the

sentencing,

then

"sentenced

Defendant

to the Department

of

Corrections for a 60-day evaluation.
On July 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with new appointed counsel,
Mr. Don S. Redd, for another sentencing hearing, at which time the
trial court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of five
years to life at the Utah State Prison,a fine of $1250.00, plus an
8 5% surcharge.

The trial court's Sentence was entered on July 26,

1995, and Judgment was entered on August 16, 1995. Defendant filed
Notice of Appeal on August 25, 1995.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On

February

8,

1995, Defendant

and

E.M.

went

to

the

apartment of Russell Young to collect monies claimed to have been
owed to them

(R. 41, lines 11-15, Transcript of April 11, 1995,

Pretrial Hearing);
2.

When Mr. Young indicated that he did not have the money,

Defendant and E.M. demanded the money again, and, in the process,

8

Mr. Young saw a gun that was in Defendant's pocket (R. 42, lines 6-8,
Transcript of April 11, 1995, Pretrial Hearing);
3.

Thereafter, by information, Defendant was charged with

Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301(1), Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b)(c), and Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (R. 10-12, Information);
4.

On March 21, 1995, Defendant appeared before the district

court for arraignment and pleaded not guilty (R. 13, Minute Entry);
5.

Pursuant to a plea negotiation, Defendant, on April 11,

1995, appeared with appointed trial counsel, Mr. William J. Albright,
for Pretrial Hearing before the district court and entered a guilty
plea to only Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony.
charges were dismissed

All other

(R. 36-45, Transcript of April 11, 1995,

Pretrial Hearing);
6.

On May 23, 1995, Defendant appeared with appointed trial

counsel for Sentencing (R. 46, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing
Hearing);
7.

At the Sentencing Hearing on May 23, 1995, the following

exchange took place:
MR, ALBRIGHT:

Your honor, if I may.

9

THE COURT: Let me tell you what I'm willing to do
this case. Having reviewed this, send her down
diagnostic and have an evaluation before commitment
the prison to determine if that's appropriate or
there's other programs.

in
to
to
if

MR. ALBRIGHT: Your honor, before we go further, in
talking with Miss Martinez, she has informed me that
she has filed a complaint at the bar against myself.
Based on that, I cannot represent her. Obviously
that's a conflict.
Mr. Cella represents the codefendant in this matter and so is unable to handle
the sentencing as well. I've talked with Mel Wilson
today and Don Redd is the attorney that will now
handle conflict cases. So we need her --.
THE COURT: But I'm not going to release her today.
I'm not going to release her while we wait.
MR. ALBRIGHT: J can't
represent
her and I'm
not
representing
her at this time.
As I said, she just
let me know today after we took the break. So -- and
I have given her copies of the report. She has it in
her possession right now. And for the record, also
today was the first time that she informed me that she
wanted to change her plea. And as I put on the record
earlier, I notified her that she did miss the 30 days.
That she had missed the 3 0 days today.
I've not
received any phone messages from Miss Martinez since
April when we were here and today's the first time
I've had that information given to me. So my
feeling
is that Don Redd needs to be informed that he's
going
to be representing
her and she needs to take the
presentence report that she has or he needs to acquire
one before she is sentenced.
J make a formal motion at this time to
withdraw
from the case on the conflict
that I have on the
record.
THE COURT:

Okay, the court

MS. MARTINEZ:
back collect.

will

grant

your

motion.

I did try calling him. He did call me
And I did call him back again and left

10

a message. I told him, please call me. Please do not
call me back collect. He never did call me back.
MR. ALBRIGHT: That was another matter. She didn't
bring up anything about the appeal. That involved -she didn't want to come to court for sentencing. She
wanted a continuance. Is that right?
MS. MARTINEZ: Yes. I also didn't -- wanted to speak
to you somemore.
MR. ALBRIGHT: I didn't talk to her any more [sic].
I talked to your clerk and your clerk had talked to
her and told [sic] that she was to come to court. So
there was nothing for me to discuss on that subject.
She phoned me, as she did state. However, I did talk
to her on that day. We did communicate.
THE COURT: Ms. Martinez, this is the time set for
sentencing.
The recommendation is
that you be
sentenced to the Utah State Prison five years to life.
I believe that I do need more information and what I'm
proposing is sentence [sic] you to the Department of
Corrections
for
a 60-day evaluation.
In the
evaluation they determine your background and make a
recommendation if you should -- if I should follow the
recommendation or that you should be in some
alternative program.
MS. MARTINEZ:
THE COURT:

Do I have to go to jail today?

Uh-huh.

MS. MARTINEZ: You can't give me a couple of days to
get things straightened out with my children, get
things put away?
THE COURT: No, and the circumstances I'm concerned
about, whether you'd be there --.
MS. MARTINEZ: I also have --my mother is also dying.
They don't give her very much time to live. I'll be
back. I'll do my time. I know I did a crime.

11

THE COURT: Well, I'm really concerned about potential
risk of not being there, given the circumstances and
therefore, I'm going to order you --.
MR. CAMPAS:
THE COURT:

You Honor -State you name.

MR • CAMPAS: Edward Campas. I'm her brother. And
your Honor, I'm the one who told her to file the
grievance against Mr. Albright because he has been
prejudiced against this.
He has asked -- she has
asked him not to represent her.
MR. ALBRIGHT:
Then she
represent her. I object to
that's not been filed with
The court has nothing to do

went ahead and had me
him bringing anything up
the court at this time.
with that.

THE COURT:
If you want to address the issue of
sentencing, that's the issue.
MR. CAMPAS:

I will guarantee she'll come back.

THE COURT: Well, if she comes back you are going to
have I think circumstances. . . .
(R. 46-51, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing) (Emphasis
Added)/
8.

That same day, the trial court signed an Order for 60 Day

Evaluation, which states in relevant part:

This matter
pronouncement
of

came before
sentence
on

the Court
for
May 23,
1995.

Plaintiff appeared by through Carvel R. Harward,
county Attorney for Davis County.
Defendant

appeared

in person

and by his

attorney,

Don Redd

[sic] . . . .

There being no legal reason presented
to
the Court why judgment should not be
pronounced,
12

and it appearing to the Court
may be appropriate
in this

that
imprisonment
case,
but more

detailed information is desirable as a basis for
determining the final
sentence,
than has been
provided by a presentence report. . . .
(R. 22, Order for 60 Day Evaluation) (Emphasis Added).
the

trial

court's

Order,

Defendant

initially

Contrary to

appeared

at

the

Sentencing Hearing on May 23, 1995, with appointed trial counsel,
William

J.

Albright,

and

then,

after

the

trial

court

granted

appointed counsel's Motion to Withdraw, Defendant appeared pro se for
the remainder of the Sentencing Hearing (R. 46-50, Transcript of May
23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing).

Defendant did not appear and was not

represented by subsequently appointed trial counsel, Mr. Don S. Redd,
until the second Sentencing Hearing on July 25, 1995

(R. 63-64,

Transcript

24, Minute

of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing; R.

Entry);
9.

On July 25, 1995, Defendant appeared with subsequently

appointed trial counsel, Mr. Don S. Redd, at the second Sentencing
Hearing (R. 63-64, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing;
R. 24, Minute Entry).

At the hearing, counsel informed the trial

court that, in the course of the evaluation, applications had been
made by the Division of Corrections on behalf of Defendant to various
programs to assist Defendant with alcohol and drug abuse (R. 64-65,
Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing).

13

In the process,

counsel advised the trial court that the Parkview treatment facility
had accepted Defendant into the an inpatient treatment program, which
would allow the court to maintain supervision over Defendant (R. 6465, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing).

In addition,

trial counsel informed the trial court of the discrepancy concerning
whether Defendant had pulled and pointed the gun on the victim (R.
66-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing);
10.

The trial court sentenced Defendant

to the Utah State

Prison for an indeterminate period of five years to life; a $1250.00
fine; plus an 85% surcharge (R. 66, lines 2-6, Transcript of July 25,
1995, Sentencing Hearing);
11.

The trial court's Sentence was entered on July 26, 1995 (R.

25-26, Sentence);
12.

The trial court signed its Judgment on August 10, 1995,

which was entered on August 16, 1995 (R. 29-31, Judgment);
13.

Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on August 25, 1995 (R. 32,

Notice of Appeal).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court violated Defendant's constitutional right

to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to appoint new
counsel to represent Defendant during the remainder of the Sentencing

14

Hearing

on

proceedings.

May

23,

1995,

a

critical

stage

in

the

criminal

By so doing, the trial court required Defendant to

involuntarily appear pro se during the Sentencing Hearing.

Because

of the trial court's failure to appoint new counsel, Defendant was
deprived of her constitutional right to an advocate who could have
marshaled commendations and arguments in mitigation of the impending
sentence that was imposed.

Finally, the trial court's failure to

appoint new counsel casts doubt of the procedural fairness and the
public's sense of fair play that is to be provided to all criminal
defendants in criminal proceedings.
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal.

However, the

underlying circumstances of the issue constitute plain error and/or
exceptional circumstances.
2.

The trial court abused its discretion in the course of

sentencing Defendant by its manifestly and inherently unfair conduct
of failing to appoint new counsel to represent during the remainder
of the Sentencing Hearing on May 23, 1995.

In addition, the trial

court, in the course of sentencing Defendant, failed to consider
legally relevant factors and failed to resolve discrepancies in the
Presentence Investigation Report.

15

ARGUMENTS
1.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
FAILING TO APPOINT NEW COUNSEL TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT
DURING THE MAY 23, 1995, SENTENCING HEARING, AND
THEREBY REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO INVOLUNTARILY APPEAR
PRO SE AT THE SENTENCING HEARING.

As a matter of well-settled law, "[a] defendant in a criminal
proceeding has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at
all critical stages of the prosecution."

U.S. Const, amend. VI;

1

Utah Const, art. I, § 12;2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1) (a) ;3 State

v.

Hamilton,

v.

Gray,
a

732 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State

601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979).

criminal

proceeding

"Sentencing is a critical stage of

at which a defendant

effective assistance of counsel."

State

1007 (Utah 1982) (citing Mempa v. Rhay,
(1967); Specht
Townsend

v.

v. Burke,

Patterson,

v.

is entitled

Caserez,

to the

656 P.2d 1005,

389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254

386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967); and

334 U.S. 756, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948)).

The right to

assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and may be waived by a

x

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
. . . have the Assistance of counsel for his defence."
2

Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel . . . ."
3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a)
prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
defend in person or by counsel."
16

provides: "In criminal
To appear in person and

competent

accused

intelligently'

made."

1987); see

also

State

1019, 1023 (1938); State
v.

Wilson,

the

waiver

v. Frampton,

Argersinger

v.

2006, 2012 (1972); Johnson

State

if

[only]

v.

Hamlin,

Zerbst,

v. Ruple,

is

knowingly

and

737 P. 2d 183, 187 (Utah
407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S. Ct.

304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct.
631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981);

563 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Utah 1977) .

intelligent waiver is required because

xx

A knowing and

[w] hen an accused manages

[her] own defense, [s]he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter,
many

of

counsel."

the

traditional

benefits

associated

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.

the violation of the constitutional
considered harmless error.
n.4

(Utah App. 1993); State

App. 1990), cert,
U.S.

with

denied,

See State
v.

the

right

to

Furthermore,

right to counsel cannot be

v. Gutierrez,

Sampson,

864 P. 2d 894, 898

808 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah

817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied,

, 112 S.Ct. 1282 (1992); Cf.

168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n.8

McKaskle

v.

Wiggins,

465 U.S.

(1984) ("Since the right of

self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases
the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its
denial is not amenable to "harmless error" analysis.

The right is

either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless").
This issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to
appoint Defendant counsel is raised for the first time on appeal.

17

Ordinarily, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court
precludes consideration of the issue on appeal.
875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).

State

v.

There are, however, two limited

but well-established exceptions to this general rule.
Archambeau,

Jennings,

820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

State

v.

The appellate court

may address an issue for the first time on appeal if the trial court
committed plain error or there are exceptional circumstances.
In State
814,

v. Eldredge,

110 S.Ct.

62

113 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied,

(1989),

the Utah Supreme

Court

Id.

493 U.S.

outlined

the

following principles involved in determining whether "plain error'7
exists:
The first requirement for a finding of plain
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from
our examination of the record, we must be able
to say that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error . . . .
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement
for a finding of plain error is that the error
affect the substantial rights of the accused,
i.e., that the error be harmful.
Id.

at 35.

1989),

u

According to State

v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah

in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found

in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the

'plain error'

standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and
elaborated upon in Eldredge

. . . ."
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The

second

exception

is

the

catch-all

Archambeau,

"exceptional" or unusual" circumstances.
923.

device

requiring

820 P. 2d at

This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that

manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an
Id.

issue on appeal."

As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial
court committed plain error in the course of sentencing Defendant by
the obvious failure, once it had granted trial counsel's Motion to
Withdraw,

to appoint new counsel to represent Defendant during the

remainder of the Sentencing Hearing.
Based on the exchange between the trial court, appointed trial
counsel, and Defendant, it should have been obvious to the trial
court

that

it

was

committing

error

by

requiring

Defendant

to

represent herself without first appointing new counsel or obtaining
See Hamilton,

a valid waiver.
at 1007.

732 P.2d at 506-07; Casarez,

656 P.2d

That such an error was plain or obvious is supported by

case law, which holds that "sentencing is a critical stage of a
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel."

Casarez,

failure

court

of

substantial

the

trial

rights

constitutional

of

right

656 P. 2d at 1007.
to

Defendant
to

the

appoint
by

depriving

assistance
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counsel

of

Secondly, the
affected

Defendant

counsel

and

of

the
her

thereby

requiring her to involuntarily represent herself in a critical stage
of the criminal proceedings.
In addition to the "plain error" exception, the instant case
presents exceptional or unusual circumstances.

Defendant was not

represented by counsel during the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing.
Consequently, Defendant, who was pro se litigant, was extremely
unfamiliar with the constitutional and procedural requirements with
which

the

trial

sentencing.
concern.
result

court

should

These requirements

have

complied

in

are of momentous

the

course

of

constitutional

To not consider and correct this matter on appeal would

in a great and manifest injustice or harm by failing to

protect the constitutional right of a litigant who was required, as
a resulit of the trial court's failures, to represent herself pro se
during the sentencing hearing.
In the instant case, during the Sentencing hearing on May 23,
1995, appointed trial counsel interrupted the trial court at the
beginning of the hearing and stated, "I can't represent [Defendant]
and I'm not representing her at this time." (R. 47, lines 21-22,
Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing).

Trial counsel then

made a "formal motion" to withdraw as counsel for Defendant, which
the trial court granted (R. 48, lines 12-16, Transcript of May 23,
1995, Sentencing Hearing).

Shortly thereafter, the trial court,
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without any inquiry as to the appointment of counsel or the knowing
and intelligent waiver by Defendant of the constitutional right to
counsel, stated, "Ms. Martinez, this is the time set for sentencing.
The recommendation is that you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison
five years to life.

I believe I need more information and what I'm

proposing is [to] sentence you to the Department of Corrections for
a 60-day evaluation." (R. 49, lines 9-14, Transcript of May 23, 1995,
Sentencing Hearing).

By so doing, the trial court improperly denied

Defendant her constitutional right to counsel when it required her to
proceed at the sentencing hearing pro se.

Because of this failure,

Defendant was deprived of her constitutional right to an advocate who
could have marshaled commendations and arguments in mitigation of the
impending sentence imposed.

Such commendations and arguments in

mitigation

include

of

incarceration

involvement in the juvenile system

Defendant's

total

lack

of

(see Presentence Investigation

Report, p. 54) , Defendant's relatively recent involvement in the
criminal justice system, which also indicates that Defendant does not
present a danger to society (see Presentence Investigation Report, p.
4

During preparation of Appellant's Brief, counsel became aware
that the Second District Court Clerk's Office neglected to include
the Presentence Investigation Report in the record upon transmittal
of the record to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Counsel is in the
process of supplementing the record. In the interest of expediting
the appeal, counsel refers to the Presentence Investigation Report by
page number until such time that the Report is transmitted to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
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6), and collateral comments from sources close to Defendant that she
is a "very good mother" with a problem centered around alcohol and
drug abuse (see Presentence Investigation Report, pp. 10-11).
failure

to

appoint

new

counsel

also

prejudiced

The

Defendant

by

preventing her, as a pro se criminal litigant, from challenging any
discrepancies

in the Presentence

Investigation Report as she is

entitled to pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a).
Similarly, in United

States

v.

Daniels,

558 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir.

1977), a rift developed between trial counsel and Defendant.
127.

Id.

at

At the outset of sentencing, trial counsel informed the court

that the defendant did not wish to be represented by counsel at
sentencing.

Id.

The defendant confirmed this and asked the trial

court to appoint new counsel for sentencing, arguing that he had been
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Id.

While

the trial court did not specifically relieve counsel, the minutes of
the hearing revealed that the parties and the trial court acted as
though counsel no longer represented the defendant.
course

of

vacating

the

defendant's

sentence

and

Id.

In the

remanding

for

resentencing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit emphasized that the defendant, for all practical purposes was
acting without counsel at sentencing.

The court further stated that

the defendant was "prejudiced by the lack of an advocate who could
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have marshalled" commendations and made arguments in mitigation of
the judgment to be imposed.

Id.

At 128.

In the more recent case of Williams
(Fla. Ct. App. 1992),

v.

State,

600 So. 2d 524

the defendant moved to dismiss his trial

counsel, which the trial court granted.

Id.

at 525.

The defendant

then requested that new counsel be appointed, which the trial court
denied, reasoning that the defendant had already had two attorneys
represent

him.

Id.

Although

the

Florida

Court

of

Appeals

sympathized with the trial court's "beleaguered" circumstances, it
held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant of his
constitutional right to counsel when it required him to proceed
against his will with the sentencing hearing pro se and remanded the
case for resentencing.

Id.

at 525-26.

Like the aforementioned cases of Daniels

and Williams,

the trial

court, in the instant case, required Defendant to represent herself
at the sentencing hearing pro se.

The instant case, however, is more

egregious inasmuch as Defendant was arguably less knowledgeable and
familiar with the procedural requirements and rights she was entitled
to

than

either

of

the

defendants

in

Daniels

or

Williams.

Furthermore, the trial court, in the instant case, had a duty when
informed of the conflict between trial counsel and Defendant and the
subsequent withdrawal of trial counsel, to immediately suspend or
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continue

the

Defendant

was

sentencing

hearing,

appropriately

without

represented

further

by

action,

counsel.

The

until
trial

court's failure to appoint counsel for the remainder of the May 23,
1995, Sentencing Hearing, casts doubt upon the justice system and the
procedural fairness that is to be provided to every defendant in the
course of criminal proceedings, especially when, as in this case,
fundamental constitutional rights are involved.

Because the trial

court failed to appoint new counsel and required Defendant to proceed
with sentencing pro se, Defendant's sentence should be vacated and
the case remanded for resentencing.

Finally, the trial court failed

in its duty to inquire as to the appointment of new counsel prior to
proceeding
continue

with
the

the

sentencing

sentencing

hearing,

hearing

until

and

it

also

Defendant

was

failed

to

properly

represented by new counsel.

2.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE COURSE OF
SENTENCING DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT WERE INHERENTLY UNFAIR
AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL
LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS•

An appellate court ""will set aside a sentence imposed by the
trial court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the
trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the
sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law.'" State
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v.

Gentlewind,

844 P. 2d 372, 375

Gibbons,

(Utah App. 1992)

(quoting State

779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)).

u

v.
An

abuse of discretion occurs only when it is ""clear that the actions

of the judge were . . . inherently

unfair.'"

State

v. Rhodes,

P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Gerrard,

818

584 P.2d

885, 887 (Utah 1978)) .
In addition to the arguments set forth in this section of the
Brief, Defendant incorporates the arguments under Defendant's abovementioned

argument

concerning

the

violation

of

Defendant's

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during
sentencing.

By failing to appoint m-* counsel for the remainder of

the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing, the trial court's actions in
the course of sentencing Defendant were inherently unfair.
conduct

on

the part

of

the

trial

court

constitutes

Such

""manifest

inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the
See Gerrard,

public sense of fair play.'"
1978) (quoting Hicklin

v.

State,

584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah

535 P.2d 743, 751 (Wyo. 1975)).

Further, the record indicates that the trial court failed to
consider

legally

Defendant.

relevant

factors

in

the

course

of

sentencing

During the second Sentencing Hearing on July 25, 1995,

the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: Is there anything you want to present to
the Court before I enter sentence in the matter?
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MR. REDD:
Yes, there is.
There have been
applications made while this evaluation was going on
for programs that would be designed to aid Ms.
Martinez in making the changes she needs to make in
her life. One of those places is Parkview. And it is
an inpatient facility.
And she informed me this
morning that they have accepted her to that program.
That's an alternat ive that I didn't notice in the
report. And maybe that information came after the
report was prepared. But there is an alternative for
the Court to put her in an inpatient facility where
she would be responsible and also receive the aid she
needs.
And she would be required to remain there. She
wouldn't have the option of dropping out because she
would be under the Court's control. And it is her
desire, and our request therefore, that the Court
utilize that option rather than the option recommended
by the report of remaining incarcerated.
THE COURT: May I just ask, usually Diagnostic checks
all those programs.
And that's a program they
regularly check. And that's not -MR. REDD:
Well, they are the ones that made the
recommendation -- the application, helped her with the
application.
It is just that the response of
acceptance of her into that program apparently has
come back since the report was prepared.
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else you would
like to present to the Court?
MR. REDD:

She would like to make a statement.

MS. MARTINEZ: I would just
a chance to go to Parkview
life together there, and get
And that's about all I have

like to say I would like
and see if I can get my
my family back together.
to say.

THE COURT: Okay, I think in terms of the report, the
recommendation is that they felt that there had to be
a long term program. I am not sure -- I am familiar
with Parkview. I don't think -- it is not long term,
26

about two or three months. I don't think it is a long
term program.
I think the Court feels given the
review and the 60 day diagnostic, the Court is going
to follow the recommendation of the Department of
Corrections. And that is, to the charge of aggravated
assault, a felony of the first degree, the Defendant
is going to be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate period of five years to life;
$1,250.00 fine, plus a surcharge of 85 percent; there
will be no firearm enhancement or anything with the
sentence in this program.
Now, if you would like to appeal the sentence the
Court has entered, you must make the appeal within 3 0
days.
MR. REDD: Your Honor, there is one other item, if I
could mention it to the Court.
Okay.
MR. REDD:
We notice in the report that there is
significance applied to the fact that Ms. Martinez
does not acknowledge pulling out the gun, pointing it
at the victim, and such things as that. And quite a
bit of credence is placed on her not making the
changes she needs to make by her taking that posture.
And we are very concerned about that.
She has adamantly maintained that didn't happen.
And the only evidence that I am aware of that is from
the victim, who has a record that certainly is more
horrendous than hers as far as believability. Yet the
people who are working with her seem to insist that
she acknowledge conduct that she says she didn't
commit. And if that's one of the roadblocks in making
the progress they want her to make, I don't know how
we get around that.
THE COURT: I think it may be well then if you want to
write a letter to the program people as her counsel
and explain that, and explain the circumstances, it
may be appropriate to do that. I think that's the
best way to address that.
(R. 65-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995, Sentencing Hearing).
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As evidenced by the aforementioned part of the record, the trial
court failed to consider and clarify whether the Parkview alternative
treatment program met the qualifications for a long term program
pursuant to the recommendation and assistance of the Department of
Corrections (see R. 65, lines 7-12 and 20-24, Transcript of July 25,
1995,

Sentencing

Hearing).

By

failing

to clarify

whether

the

Parkview treatment facility is a long term program sufficient for the
needs of Defendant in the treatment of her alcohol and drug abuse,
the trial court failed to consider relevant factors

in the course of

sentencing Defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6)(a) provides, in relevant part:
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been
resolved by the parties and the department prior
to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention
of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant
an additional ten working days to resolve the
alleged inaccuracies of the report with the
department.
If after ten working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall
make a determination of relevance and accuracy
on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1) (b) (ii) states that "[a]ny diagnostic
evaluation report ordered by the court is supplemental to and becomes
a part of the presentence investigation report."
At the Sentencing Hearing on July 25, 1995, Defendant's trial
counsel brought to the court's attention the discrepancy concerning
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whether or not Defendant actually pulled the gun and pointed it at
the victim in the course of the events serving as a basis for the
aggravated robbery charge (R. 66-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995,
Sentencing

Hearing).

The

trial

court

failed

to

resolve

this

discrepancy in the manner set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(6) (a), which requires the trial court, in the event that the matter
cannot be resolved between the parties, to make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.

Such a determination is

critical not only to the sentence imposed but to the remainder of
Defendant's involvement with the correctional system, including the
Board of Pardons.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the
Court vacate her sentence and remand the case for resentencing so
that Defendant might have the opportunity

to be represented by

counsel during sentencing and so the trial court might consider all
legally relevant factors in the course of imposing sentence.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant
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issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel at the critical stage of sentencing, which
is

a matter

of

continuing

public

interest

and

involves

requiring further development in the area of criminal law.

issues
Counsel

for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official
Publication" for purposes of precedential value in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Un)

day of February, 1996.

JREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

Wiggi
Attorneys for Appellant
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